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Schuster: The Doctrine of Consequential Loss as Affected by Valuation Formu

THE DOCTRINE OF CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS AS
AFFECTED BY VALUATION FORMULASt
An important qualification to the obligation to give just
compensation' upon the exercise of eminent domain' is the
consequential loss doctrine. Broadly stated, the doctrine
denies compensation for those losses suffered by the owner
which are incidental to the taking itself. This incidental
character of the concept has been expressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court:
The Fifth Amendment concerns itself solely with the
"property," i.e., with the owner's relation as such to
the physical thing and not with other collateral
interests which may be incident to his ownership.'
Leaving aside for the moment the question of the difficulty
of distinguishing between "the physical thing" and "collateral interests," the rationale for this denial of compensation
has been "that the sovereign need only pay for what it actually
takes rather than for all the owner has lost." 4
Given an available category of non-compensable losses,
the courts have applied the doctrine to such losses as the
expenses incurred by moving to a new location,' profits lost
because of business interruption' or inability to relocate,7
t
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

This Comment should be read in conjunction with the student symposium
appearing in the last issue of the LAND & WATER LAW REviEW--Eminent
Domain: A Need for Policy Re-Consideration,4 LAND & WATER L. REV. 191
(1969).
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
All states, with the exception of one, have constitutional provisions for
compensation upon the exercise of eminent domain. In the one state that
does not, North Carolina, this requirement has been read into the constitution by judicial interpretation. See Staton v. Norfolk & C.R.R., 111 N.C.
278, 16 S.E. 181 (1892). Mr. W. S. Perlroth has compiled a breakdown of
the various provisions in state constitutions. It can be found in MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES 536 n.1 (1935).
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
R. J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988, 994 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946) ; United States
v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261, 264 (1950); Highway
Comm'n v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 281 P.2d 707, 722 (1955). See
also 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 69 (2d ed. 1953) (hereinafter cited as ORGEL). Some courts have disagreed, however, allowing
compensation by including such expenses as an element of market value or
by allowing them as a separate item of recovery. Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill,
135 Conn. 686, 67 A.2d 851 (1949) (included within market value); West
Side Elevated R.R. v. Siegel, 161 Ill. 638, 44 N.E. 276 (1896) (separate
item of recovery).
See generally 1 ORaEL § 72. But here again some courts have established
exceptions. The Supreme Court of Texas has held that in the case of a
partial taking, resulting injury to the business may be included as an
element of market value. City of Dallas v. Priolo, 150 Tex. 423, 242
S.W.2d 176, 179 (1951).
For a detailed analysis of this element of loss, see 4 LAND & WATER L. REV.
193 (1969).
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damage to or destruction of good will,8 and costs of removing
business property from the condemned premises.' The doctrine has been employed by the courts even though it is recognized to be both harsh on the owner of the property" and in
derogation of the principle of just compensation. 1
The misgivings felt by the courts in denying compensation
are magnified when one considers the effect of the doctrine
on land use policy in general. In a nation that is devoting
increased attention to public involvement in transportation,
housing, recreation, and education systems, a doctrine that
authorizes non-compensable losses has serious implications
for the proper allocation of land resources. Therefore, the
purpose of this Comment is to examine the consequential loss
doctrine in the context of present and future demands on
limited land resources. To this end, the text will be divided
into three areas of discussion: 1) Development of the Doctrine,
2) Evaluation, and 3) Proposed Method of Alteration.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE

DOCTRINE

Three terms within the provisions of the federal and state
constitutions have been used to determine the issue of compensability in eminent domain proceedings: a) Property, b)
Taking, and c) Just Compensation. This section of the comment will treat each term separately in order to discover the
extent to which they individually affect the scope of the
consequential loss doctrine. In so doing, it will then be
possible to isolate the primary determinant of the doctrine
and thereby recommend alteration of the doctrine through
analysis of that determinant. Without this sort of treatment,
any recommendations for change would lack the focus necessary for intelligent analysis.
8. In re Jeffries Homes Housing Project, 306 Mich. 638, 11 N.W.2d 272 (1943).
9. 1 ORGEL § 70. In refusing to follow the rule some courts have entirely
rejected the market value standard of compensation when dealing with this
item of loss. See West Side Elevated R.R. v. Siegel, 161 Ill. 638, 44 N.E. 276
(1896).
10. "[T]he consequences often are harsh. For these whatever remedy may
exist lies with Congress." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 382 (1945).
11. "No doubt, therefore, if the owner is to be made whole for the loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these elements [consequential losses] should properly be considered. But the courts have generally
held that they are not to be reckoned as part of the compensation for the
fee taken by the Government." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 379 (1945).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss2/10

2

Schuster: The Doctrine of Consequential Loss as Affected by Valuation Formu

1969

COMMENTS

In determining the scope of the doctrine, the three terms
have had an inverse and interrelated effect. The relationship
between the terms and the doctrine of consequential loss is
inverse in the sense that as the definitions of the terms become more restrictive, the scope of the doctrine increases to
embrace additional instances of incidental loss. This relationship can best be understood by analogizing it to the mathematical concept of an inverse proportion: as the determinative
factor (the three terms) become smaller, the determinedfactor
(the doctrine) becomes greater. But in addition to having an
inverse effect, the terms have also been interrelated in the
sense that a change in the consequential loss doctrine has
required a change in the definition of all three terms.
An analysis of the separate terms demonstrates both the
inverse and interrelated effect. In the process it can be shown
that valuation formulas which have been designed to effectuate the principles of the third term-just compensationaccount for the present breadth of the doctrine. The other
two are either largely irrelevant as a determinant or are so
broadly defined that if the terms did not have an interrelated
nature, affecting the doctrine in tandem rather than individually, the scope of the doctrine would be greatly restricted.
Thus, valuation formulas will be isolated as the primary
determinant of the consequential loss doctrine, and, thus, present themselves as the proper focus for altering the scope of
the doctrine.
a) Property: Although property was originally thought
of in physical terms, stressing its "specific, fixed, and tangible nature,"1 2 the term now implies a right which may or
may not be recognized in a particular instance. Thus, property has been given a relative nature in which its existence
for a certain purpose is dependent upon whether the court
will recognize the right. The Supreme Court referred most
clearly to this relative nature of the property concept in
United States v. Willow River Power Co. :"
But not all economic interests are "property rights;"
only those economic advantages are "rights" which
have the law back of them, and only when they are so
12. Commissioners of Homochitto River v. Withers, 29 Miss. 21 (1855).
13. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
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recognized may courts compel others to forbear from
interfering with them or to compensate for their
invasion.14
As a result of this method of defining property, courts
have been influenced to decide the property issue by reference
to other terms. In so doing, they can then determine whether
a particular interest is legally protected, and is, thus, property for purposes of eminent domain. This process imparts
to the property concept a relative nature, a nature that takes
its content from the meaning given to it by the other two
terms-taking and just compensation. Thus, what would
appear to be a property interest under commonly understood
definitions of that term might not be considered property
for purposes of compensation in eminent domain proceedings
because the interest was not "taken" or because the interest
was outside the scope of a particular valuation formula. At
the very least, it could be said that the property concept
affects the scope of the consequential loss doctrine only indirectly. Consequently, the use of the term "property" as a
method of determining the scope of the consequential loss
doctrine was superseded by the use of the terms "taking"
and "just compensation." If it takes its meaning from other
terms, the search for the relevant determinants of the doctrine's scope should pass to those other terms.
b) Taking: The taking concept has progressed through
three stages, each representing a broadening of the term to
include more instances of incidental loss. The first stage
interpreted taking in terms of an actual physical appropriation. This restrictive concept was weakened by developments
within Supreme Court decisions and by revisions of state
constitutions, thereby leading to the second stage. This stage
emphasized the directness of a particular interference. Recent
decisions, however, show the outlines of a third stage which
gives emphasis to an interference with the use of property.
The broadness of this approach would allow many incidental
losses to be compensated if it were the sole determinant of the
scope of the consequential loss doctrine.
As first used in connection with incidental losses, courts
interpreted "taking" in a strict physical sense. Reasoning
14. Id. at 502.
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that the government need only pay for what it takes, courts
felt that taking a physical appropriation of tangible interests. 5 Since most condemnation actions involved realty, the
obligation to compensate was applied to the land itself, but
not to intangible interests.
The physical approach was weakened, however, by two
separate developments. First, the Supreme Court held in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. that a physical appropriation
was not required; rather, a taking could be found when the
land was flooded due to a back-up of water from a dam."6
Second, many states revised their constitutions to include
the word "damaged" in conjunction with the word "taken."
Under such constitutions it became necessary only to show
an injury directly attributable to government action.' 7 In
combination the effect of these two developments was to
supplant the physical approach with a test that considered
the directness or indirectness of the particular interference."
The major effect of the direct-indirect test was to classify as a consequential loss those interests in property that
were considered remote and those interests in property other
than the property actually condemned. However, there is
some indication that the term "taking" is broadening even
further. Thus, courts have found proper damage elements
for flooded land, for the effect of a taking on non-contiguous
land,2" for the disturbance caused by low flying airplanes,"
for the "taking" of trade routes even though the government
15. See Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418, 430 (Mass. 1823) in which the court
refers to "property actually taken and appropriated by the government."
16. 13 Wall. 166 (1871).
17. "Under this provision property is damaged when it is made less valuable,
less useful, or less desirable, and it is immaterial whether such damage
occurs by reason of the construction or the maintenance of the project, so
long as it is directly attributable to such causative factor and irrespective
of whether or not there has been an actual physical taking of any part of
such property." 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 512-13 (rev. 3d ed., 1963).
See also Mississippi State Hwy. Comm'n v. Colonial Inn, Inc., 246 Miss. 422,
149 So.2d 851 (1963).
18. "The decisive factor in each of these cases, and in others which follow the
same principle, is that the personal property or other rights had been directly appropriated or destroyed by actions of agents or officials of the government. The losses of property involved in these cases were not merely incidental or indirect consequences of a taking of other property; rather, they
were the direct products of the actual invasion or taking of the property
involved." R. J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988, 993 (Ct. Cl.
1966).
19. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
20. United States v. Evans, 380 F.2d 761, 764 (10th Cir. 1967).
21. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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was not going to take advantage of them,2" and for the interference with the enjoyment of property caused by traffic
noise." Moreover, it has been generally held that the consequential loss doctrine is not applicable to some elements of
damage caused by a partial taking.2 4
When the recent cases are compared to the taking concept evidenced by earlier cases such as Callender v. Marsh,25
the conclusion is apparent that courts have significantly
developed the taking concept. From an emphasis on actual
physical appropriation, courts in recent cases seem to be
moving toward a concept of taking which emphasizes interference with the use or enjoyment of property. This deduction is especially appropriate in connection with the airport
and traffic noise decisions.
The taking concept has, therefore, significantly evolved
from the nascent stage in which a taking would be found
only in the case of a direct physical appropriation of tangible
property. With the present emphasis on the use value of
property, a taking could be found for intangibles such as
certain contracts, good will, and possibly removal and relocation costs. Yet, even with the inclusive definition of taking
that is emerging from recent decisions, such intangibles are
still generally considered to be non-compensable.
The reason for this continuing application of the consequential loss doctrine to intangibles which are within the
definition of the taking concept lies in the inverse relationship
between the three terms-property, taking, and just compensation-and the doctrine. Each term, of course, has a
separate, individual meaning, but an expansion of that mean22. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
23. Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 239 N.E.2d 708 (1968). See also State
Hwy. Dep't v. Augusta Dist. of N. Georgia Conference of Methodist
Churches, 155 Ga. App. 162, 154 S.E.2d 29 (1967).
24. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). The liberalization
of result under the partial taking rule can be seen in a recent New York
decision. In Casamassima v. State, 53 Misc.2d 680, 279 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) the court held that where a condemner's partial taking had the
effect of making it appear that the landowner could not offer passing
motorists parking space while they patronized his soft ice cream stand, the
landowner should be awarded consequential damages even though the measurement of the remainder showed that the same number of cars that could
be accommodated was nearly the same before and after the taking. The
court noted that the success of the landowner's business in passing motorists
was significantly linked to the apparent parking space.
25. Supra, note 15.
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ing affects the scope of the doctrine only if there has been
an expansion in meaning of the other two terms. Thus, if
the scope of the consequential loss doctrine is to decrease, the
definition of each term must be broadened to include a wider
scope of incidental losses.
This joint expansion has not occurred; rather, the meaning of two of the terms has expanded, while that of the thirdjust compensation- has remained relatively static. The property concept, because the determination as to whether a particular interest is legally protected is dependent upon the
other two terms, has become largely irrelevant to the scope
of the consequential loss doctrine. The taking concept has, on
the other hand, broadened to the point that many losses which
are presently considered to be non-compensable are within
its scope. Consequently, one term is irrelevant as a determinant of the scope of the doctrine; another is broadly enough
defined that if it were the sole determinant of the doctrine's
scope, the consequential loss doctrine would have a very
restricted application. The remaining term-just compensation-must, therefore, be considered the primary determinant
of the present scope of the doctrine of consequential loss. If
the valuation formulas which have developed from the principles of just compensation would be broadened or altered to
include incidental losses, this expansion when combined with
the development of the other two terms would yield a corresponding decrease in the scope of the doctrine. Thus, analysis must focus on the valuation formulas which have been
designed to effectuate the principles of just compensation.
c) Just Compensation: Courts have defined this term in
one of two distinct ways. The first requires compensation to
be an equivalent to that which was taken while the second
emphasizes a placement of the condemnee in the same position
as occupied before the taking. These different conceptions of
the term are not as important, however, as the valuation
formulas that have developed to effectuate the different conceptions. It is here, in valuation formulas, that the consequential loss doctrine is given its primary support.
It is possible to isolate three formulas which have been
used to compute the condemnation award: (i) Value to taker,
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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(ii) Value to owner, and (iii) Transfer value based on
general demand. Of the three, the first two are generally
rejected by present courts, although at times a court will
employ one of the two when either there is no ascertainable
demand or there is a partial taking.
(i) Value to taker: It is well established that courts will
not consider value to the taker as the standard of awarding
compensation upon the exercise of eminent domain." This
general rule is qualified, however, by one exception. If the
use to which the condemning authority is to put the land
could be available or adaptable to other parties, the value
to the taker is representative of a general value, and consequently can be considered in determining just compensation."1
Thus, a proper statement of the general rule would be that
"values in a market created solely by the need of the taker
for the property taken are not fair market values to measure
constitutionally guaranteed just compensation.""8
The most frequent reason advanced for denying compensation computed by the value-to-taker formula is that exaggerated awards would result from its use. 9 Because the
condemnor would have to pay almost any price, the cost of
public improvement would be too high. The feared consequence is that the government would not then be capable of
employing its power of eminent domain to provide for public
improvements."0
(ii) Value to owner: It is equally well established that
a formula based on value to the owner will not be accepted
as the standard of compensation. 1 By refusing to apply such
a formula, the courts make clear that the principle of indem26. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934); United States ex rel
T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943); J. A. Tobin Constr. Co. v.
United States, 343 F.2d 422, 423 (10th Cir. 1965).
27. Mississippi & Rum River Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
28. J. A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 422, 423 (10th Cir. 1965).
29. See JAHR, LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1957) (hereinafter cited as JAIHR).
30. The refusal by the courts to consider value to the taker as a factor in
assessing compensation has been criticized in a recent article. The authors
argue that it should be irrelevant as a standard only when the taker exercises an "extraordinary demand". Recognizing that the determination of
what constitutes an extarordinary demand would be difficult, they feel "the
law should not retreat whenever problems cannot be disposed of by simple,
hard-and-fast rules." Sengstock & McAuliffe, What is the Price of Eminent
Domain? An Introduction to the Problems of Valuation in Eminent Domain
Proceedings, 44 J. OF URBAN LAW 185 at 189 (1966).
31. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
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nification does not control compensation in eminent domain.
This rule is qualified, however, by two exceptions which will
be discussed later, namely when there is no ascertainable
market value and when there is a partial taking.
In rejecting this formula, it is recognized that the condemnation process does not reflect the value determinants
which an owner would consider in a true market situation.
Consequently, the "full and perfect equivalent" language
used to define just compensation is not met by the valuation
process. The conflict between the two statements was noted
by the Supreme Court in United States v. General Motors
Corp.:
No doubt, therefore, if the owner is to be made whole
for the loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of
his property, these elements should properly be considered. But, the courts have generally held that they
are not to be reckoned as part of the compensation
for the fee taken by the Government. 2
Thus, it can be seen that the refusal to accept this valuation formula reflects the general attitude of American courts
to deny compensation for those losses which can be classified
as consequential."3
(iii) Transfer value based on general demand: Rather
than value to the taker or value to the owner, American
courts have accepted transfer value based on general demand
as the formula for determining just compensation. "Most
things ...

have a general demand which gives them a value

transferable from one owner to another. As opposed to such
personal and variant standards as value to the particular
owner whose property has been taken, this transferable value
has an external validity which makes it a fair measure of
public obligation to compensate the loss incurred by an
owner as a result of the taking of his property for public
use ,) .34
The measurement of general demand is expressed in
terms of market value formulas. As the market value concept
32. 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
33. See generally, JAHR § 69.
34. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 4 [1969], Iss. 2, Art. 10

548

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. IV

normally entails both a willing buyer and a willing seller, 5
market value formulas include such language, but in addition
four other principles are generally appended to that core
definition: The property is valued at the time of taking;8
to the extent that it influences market value, the property
can be appraised at its "highest and best use";" remote or
speculative losses will not be considered in valuation estimates ;" in valuing a tract of land sustaining multiple interests3" courts will treat the fee as if it were unencumbered or
undivided, and then allocate awards from that larger sum
for the separate interests."
Utilizing these four principles as appendages to the core
concept of market value, the market value formula can be
stated in the following manner: Market value is that amount
which would be paid on the date of taking under normal
circumstances on the free and open market, in the usual course
of dealings, by a willing buyer not forced to buy and which
amount would be acceptable to a willing seller not forced to
sell. The property may be appraised at its highest and best
35.

36.

37.

88.

39.

40.

(hereinafter cited as
INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS § 11.05 (1966)
PIK).
"The decisions are uniform in holding that the value at the time of the
taking is the measure of compensation to which the landowner is entitled
when property is taken by the Federal government in eminent domain proceedings." Miller v. United States, 125 F.2d 75, 80 (9th Cir. 1942). See also
MATHES & DEVITT, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 83.13
(1965); PIK § 11.03.
The Supreme Court has defined the principle in the following manner:
"Just compensation includes all elements of value that inhere in the property, but it does not exceed market value fairly determined. The sum
required to be paid the owner does not depend upon the uses to which he
has devoted his land but is to be arrived at upon just consideration of all
the uses for which it is suitable. The highest and most profitable use for
which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the
reasonably near future is to be considered, not necessarily as the measure
of value, but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use
affects the market value while the property is privately held." Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. New York, 139 F.2d 1007, 1012 (2d Cir.
1944); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901, 908-909 (10th Cir. 1965);
Comstock v. Iowa State Hwy. Comm'n, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205, 210
(1963).
In many cases the question arises whether one actually has an interest in
the property. Normally, courts will apply a standard to the claimed interest
that is similar to the remote or speculative principle of the market value
formula: "The interest which, under the constitutions and statutes, entitles
a person to compensation for injury must have a direct and actual concrete
connection with the specific land attempted to be taken." Deepe v. United
States, 103 Colo. 294, 86 P.2d 242, 243 (1938). It has, thus, been held that
many contractual rights are noncompensable because their connection to
the res is not sufficiently direct. See generally, 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 13.33 (4th ed., 1964).
Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 160 F.2d 182, 184 (5th Cir.
1947); Cuyahoga County v. United States, 294 F.2d 775, 777 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
PATTERN
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use, but remote or speculative uses or interests shall not be
considered. If the property supports multiple interests, it
shall be valued in a hypothetically unencumbered condition.4
The market value formula is conditioned by three recognized exceptions. First, if there is no ascertainable market
for the property, courts will revert to other measures, usually
value to the owner.2 Second, value to the owner is an allowable formula for some losses occasioned by a partial taking.4"
Third, the market value test has been discarded or held
inapplicable when valuation is made at unique times4 4 or the
property has special uses."'
In contrast to the property concept, the utilization of
which is dependent on the other two terms, and the taking
concept, which is now sufficiently broad to include most
forms of consequential loss, the market value formula, a
formula designed to effectuate the principle of just compensation, has been employed by the courts to deny compensation to those forms of loss classified as consequential. Within this classification, the four following categories represent
41. The austerity of this statement of the formula should be compared to one
of the less burdensome instructions which have been proposed for use within
a particular jurisdiction: "By fair market value is meant the amount for
which the property could be sold in the market on a sale by an owner willing,
but not compelled to sell, and to a purchaser willing and able, but not
obliged, to buy. This phrase does not mean what could be obtained for the
property at a forced sale or at a sale made under unusual or extraordinary
circumstances, or what might be obtained from a particular individual who
might be willing to pay an excessive price for his special purpose. Sentimental value to the owner or his unwillingness to part with the property
can have no consideration in determining the market value.
"In answering both of these questions of the special verdict, it is
proper to take into consideration, as shown by the evidence, the use to
which the property was put by the owner, or any other use to which it is
reasonably adaptable, and you may base your determination on the most
advantageous use thus shown to exist, either at the time in question or
within a reasonable time in the near future. The future uses considered,
if any, must be so reasonably probable as to affect present market value.
They must not be possible uses based upon mere fancy, speculation, theory,
or conjecture. Everything that gave this parcel of real estate intrinsic
value, as shown by the evidence, is proper for your consideration." WiscoNSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CIvIL § 8100 (1960). This instruction has been
approved by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Kreuscher v. Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 27 Wis.2d 351, 134 N.W.2d 487 (1965).
42. In Comstock v. Iowa State Hwy. Comm'n, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205,
210 (1963) the court could find no evidence of the market value of real
estate comprising part of a leasehold. Consequently, they allowed evidence
of "intrinsic or actual value." See also PIK § 11.06.
43. See Pima County v. De Concini, 79 Ariz. 154, 285 P.2d 609 (1955); American
Louisiana Pipe Line Co. v. Kennerk, 103 Ohio App. 133, 144 N.E.2d 660
(1957).
44. Howell v. State Hwy. Dep't, 167 So. Car. 217, 166 S.E. 129 (1932).
45. Housing Authority of Shreveport v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295, 298
(1942) ; Newton Girl Scout Council v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,
335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956).
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some of the more frequently recurring losses: lost profits,
injury to or destruction of good will, moving expenses, and
certain contractual interests in or arising from the ownership
of the property.
Within these four categories, courts generally refuse to
compensate on the basis of the loss being consequential. Thus,
lost profits, good will, moving expenses, and certain contractual interests-losses which could broadly be termed business
losses-are elements of value which are noncompensable primarily because they do not, in the opinion of most courts,
come within the scope of the market value formula. The
condemnee is, therefore, required to assume a significant cost
of public improvements, the property for which is acquired
through eminent domain proceedings.
The market value formula which has arisen from the
principles of just compensation can, thus, be seen as the
primary determinant of the presently large scope of the
consequential loss doctrine. Because the other two terms that
have historically affected the scope of the doctrine are now
either irrelevant as a determinant or so broad that they
embrace many forms of incidental loss, the interrelated
nature of the three terms demands that valuation formulas
be liberalized if the inverse relationship between the terms
and the doctrine is to operate so as to decrease the scope of
the consequential loss doctrine. Valuation formulas are,
therefore, the focus of analysis. But before liberalization is
proposed, it must first be established that the doctrine of
consequential loss should have a more restricted scope.
II.

EVALUATION

Historically, denial of incidental losses in eminent domain
was both understandable and equitable. Even when government taking moved from the stage of causing few such losses
and entered the stage of condemning in an industrializing
society, denial of such losses was justified on the basis that
national development necessitated a liberal application of the
public use concept. However, in recent years two developments-the broadened scope of the public use concept and the
increased acreage acquired through eminent domain proceedhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss2/10
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ings-enhance the salience of examining the consequential
loss doctrine, and questioning the present-day validity of
denying compensation for incidental losses.
The fifth amendment qualifies the power of eminent
domain by requiring the taking be for a "public use." 6 This
concept has been so broadened, however, that the qualification
has little practical relevance. Thus, in Berman v. Parker
the Supreme Court held that the government may condemn
private property simply to improve the aesthetic appearance
of a community. 7 It is, therefore, an obvious conclusion that
the power of the government to condemn land has been
enhanced.
Combined with the enhanced power to condemn is an
increased tendency to do so. In the period from December,
1963, to December, 1967, 4,090 acres of land were acquired
by condemnation for urban renewal purposes alone. 4' Although the percentage of acquisitions by condemnation should
decrease in relation to acquisitions by means such as negotiation,4" in absolute terms acquisitions by condemnation should
increase.
46. Supra, note 1.
47. "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled.... If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way."
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
48. The Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development has stated in a personal letter to the author that 17,391 acres
of land were acquired for urban renewal purposes from December, 1963, to
December, 1967. The total acreage was acquired during that period by the
following methods:
Land acquired by Condemnation
Quick take with no determined price ....
336 acres
Price determined by court decision
2,443
Price determined by agreement 1,310
Total
Land acquired by Negotiation
Land acquired by Donation --Streets, alleys, public rights-of-way
acquired by vacation

4,090 acres
1,196 acres
441 acres
1,665 acres

Total
---17,391 acres*
Total not yet acquired
--11,215 acres
*Represents a round figure
49. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 provides that as a condition of eligibility for Federal assistance "the applicant shall make every
reasonable effort to acquire the real property by negotiated purchase." 42
U.S.C. § 3072 (Supp. II 1964).
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Moreover, takings presently affected under the expanded
public use concept generally involve concentrated and contiguous urban areas and result in magnified incidental damages. These changing circumstances accentuate the deficiencies in condemnation compensation and militate in favor of
effecting a more equitable balance between the principles of
public improvement and private improvement.
Traditional criticism of the doctrine of consequential
loss has centered on two aspects of what has been termed
"the fundamental unfairness" of the doctrine. First, the
doctrine has been criticized because it discriminates between
those on whom loss from eminent domain falls. Those who
have a valid, but remote, interest in land receives no compensation while the fee holder is not subjected to the doctrine.
The second criticism has been that "it requires those who
suffer uncompensated injuries to bear directly and in undue
proportion the economic expense of projects designed to
benefit the public.""
Although these criticisms are valid, they do little more
than demonstrate the fact, acknowledged by both scholars
and courts, that the doctrine is inequitable. An important fact
to recall, however is that even though the court in United
States v. General Motors Corp. could refer to the doctrine as
"harsh" and in derogation of the principle of indemnification,
the consequential loss doctrine was, nevertheless, applied."
This recognition can be understood when it is explained that
many courts have interpreted the word "just" in the phrase
"just compensation" to require an economic fairness to both
condemnee and condemnor. 2 Thus, in awarding compensation
in eminent domain proceedings, courts move between two
conflicting policies: a) Indemnification of the condemnee,
and b) Making the cost of exercise of the power of eminent
domain not so burdensome on the public purse as to discourage, or economically forbid, public improvements. Hence,
50. Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain,
48 VA. L. REV. 437, 455 (1962).
51. See notes 13 and 14 supra.
52. "When we speak of just compensation, we have in mind a figure that will
be fair and just, not only to the property owner, but also to the condemning
authority. The word 'just' intensifies the meaning of the word 'compensation', conveying the idea that the equivalent to be paid for the property
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample." Port of New York Authority v. Howell, 59 N.J. Super. 343, 157 A.2d 731, 734 (1960).
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the consequential loss doctrine can be seen as being deliberately sustained by the American judiciary because it provides
a compromise between the conflicting policies. Incidental
losses are absorbed, therefore, by the condemnee so as to
free the government to make public improvements. Although
this is admittedly unjust and inequitable, many are persuaded
that the doctrine is wise because it resolves the conflict.
Moreover, with the increased emphasis on acquisition
and subsequent transformation of land for urban needs by
both state and federal governments, the policy of considering
the governments' ability to afford public improvements is
placed in a more favorable light. Consequently, the argument
that rests primarily on equitable grounds should have decreasing persuasive force with legislatures and courts. What must
be demonstrated, therefore, is that the consequential loss
doctrine is unwise, a statement that is not established merely
by showing a particular practice to be inequitable. Courts
and legislatures must be persuaded that by denying incidental
losses they encourage a policy of land use allocation which
lacks wisdom for a nation facing increased demands on its
land resources.
It must first be recognized that land takes its value from
the uses to which it is put. This is true even for one who puts
his land to no apparent use by escaping the city, building a
home on a large tract of land that commands a country
horizon, and merely enjoying the rural simplicity of his life.
For that person, the use value is constituted by the fact that
the land is put to no apparent use; its usefulness to that
person stems from its wildness. The more obvious example,
however, is land that supports business and other interests.
Here, then, the uses would be multiple-a factory, public
utility easements, leases, executory contracts related to the
business, and future interests.
When land is considered in terms of use value, two obvious implications are created for eminent domain. First, an
interference with a use constitutes an impairment of value.
Therefore, when one's property is so affected as to constitute
an interference with a use, the action, if a governmental action,
should be classified either within the police power or within
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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the power of eminent domain. 3 If it falls within the scope
of the latter, compensation is due. Thus, the recent cases
construing the meaning of "taking," especially those involving traffic and airplane noise, 4 stress the use value of
property.
The second implication is that when the government takes
land, there has occurred a substitution of uses. Whether
intended or not the most basic form of land use decision has,
thereby, been made. The taking process, therefore, should be
seen as an allocation of uses which constitutes a part of the
nation's overall land use policy. It is, simply, a determinant
of land use allocation.
This factor gains added relevance when one considers
the demands being made on available land resources. In this
regard, certain statistics are important. It has been estimated that by the year 2000: a) total population will increase
to 350 million; b) of this population, three-fourths will live
in metropolitan areas; c) the average work week will drop to
32 hours; d) disposable income will rise from $706 billion
in 1976 to $1,437 billion in 2000; e) great advances in individual mobility will have culminated." From these statistics
several conclusions can be drawn. First, the increase in population with its urban focus will require a definite expansion
of the industrial base in and around urban centers. Second,
the increase in leisure time will require an expansion of service
and entertainment related facilities. Third, the mobility advances will enhance the need for a more viable transportation
system. Fourth, the rise in disposable income will allow individuals to take advantage of the expanded, deepened environment. Thus, the demands on land will be varied, intense, and
initiated by both the private and governmental sectors. This
53. It is the obligation of compensation that constitutes the chief practical distinction between eminent domain and the police power to regulate. The
concepts, however, tend to merge in certain situations such as a permanent
injunction against a business due to its non-compliance with air pollution
statutes. In such cases the test proposed by Professor Joseph Sax is helpful.
He has characterized a compensable loss resulting from the exercise of
eminent domain as a "government enhancement of its resource position in
its enterprise capacity." Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J.
36, 63 (1964).
54. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
55. These figures were projected in a study conducted by the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission. BARLOWE, LAND FOR RECREATION IN
LAND USE POLICY AND PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 272 (H. Ottoson ed.
1963).
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situation creates a severely elastic demand curve for urban
land uses in which both public and private groups compete,
in contrast to the relatively inelastic demand curve for agricultural land uses.
Given a general elasticity of demand for land, and a
specifically high elasticity for urban land uses, it is important
to consider the effect that a particular practice, either public
or private, has on land use allocation. In short, the determinants of that allocation should be examined for their wisdom,
for if the development of land uses within the next three
decades is haphazard, and lacking in rational control, the
pattern of allocation could be totally inappropriate for the
needs of the nation in the year 2000. To provide efficient
resource use, land use conflicts must be rationally resolved.
It has been suggested that the resolution of land use
conflict be seen in terms of rationing and bargaining transactions." The first of these involves the establishment and
enforcement of working rules by the collective superior against
the citizen inferior. Bargaining transactions, on the other
hand, are those that resolve conflicts between citizens as
equals. Rationing transactions, a classification of which
eminent domain is a part, have the dual effect, therefore, of
making allocation of land uses as well as establishing the
limits within which land use decision-making will be left to
legal equals.
Furthermore, within each transaction, whether a rationing or a bargaining transaction, market bidding for the land
resources should avoid dissociation of the incidence of benefits and costs, a dissociation characterized by the consequential loss doctrine:
If benefits and costs are dissociated, the production
of benefits unconnected with costs will be pushed to
marginal products of zero value, whereas unavoidable costs incurred without off-setting benefits cannot be curtailed to equilibrate with resultant marginal value product. Hence, "too many" inputs will
be committed to the production of "uncosted" benefits or to the imposition of "unbenefited costs."
56. Kelso, Resolving Land Use Conflicts in LAND USE POLICY AND PROBLEMS

IN THE UNITED STATES 282-303 (H. Ottoson ed. 1963).
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Dissociation conflicts result in distorted land use
and development."
The consequential loss doctrine has the failing of dissociating the incidence of benefits and costs. In supporting
a doctrine that denies compensation to the owner and interest
holders of a parcel of land, the American judiciary allows the
condemning authority to receive the benefits of title without
equilibriating costs. The dissociation caused by this encouragement of "uncosted benefits" improperly and unwisely
allocates land to a particular use. Because of this lack of
wisdom rather than any inequities caused by the doctrine,
courts and legislatures should consider alteration of the doctrine, thereby providing for a rational resolution of land use
conflicts.
III.

PROPOSED METHOD OF ALTERATION

If alteration of the consequential loss doctrine is to be
considered, attention must be given to the determinants of
the doctrine. It has been shown that three terms-property,
taking, and just compensation-inversely affect the content
of the doctrine, is scope decreasing as the definitions of the
three terms broaden. But upon analysis of each, only onejust compensation-plays a significant role in sustaining the
presently broad scope of the doctrine.
The property concept is dependent upon whether a legally
protected interest can be found. To that issue, therefore, the
other two terms must be used. Hence, the property concept
affects the doctrine only through the meaning given to it by
the other terms. Analysis must, thus, pass to the other
concepts.
The taking concept appears to be at a threshold stage.
Recent cases, by equating an interference with the use value
of property with a taking, have broadly construed the term.
Hence, if the trend continues, the inverse relationship between the term and the doctrine would allow the doctrine to
be significantly limited in scope. Thus, if one is interested
in diminishing the doctrine, analysis should pass to a term
that sustains its broad scope.
57. Id. at 292-93.
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The concept of just compensation, effectuated through
valuation formulas must, therefore, be the focus of analysis.
The property concept is largely irrelevant; the taking concept is now sufficiently broad so that if it alone were the
determinant of the consequential loss doctrine, the scope of
the doctrine would be indeed limited. Thus, whether change
be initiated by the courts or by the legislatures, valuation
formulas should be considered as the method of change.
If the market value formula is discarded and a new
valuation formula substituted, it is suggested that the new
formula explicitly be designed to protect three interests.
First, the reliance interest should be protected. This would
give compensation not only to the fee interest but also to less
complete interests such as leases, easements, and future interests. Second, the expectation interest should be protected.
Thus, if an interest holder had an investment in the property
(such as a contract for the removal of gravel) or an investment
that arises from his ownership but which has no relationship
to the actual property (such as a supply contract between a
shoe factory located on the property and the Department of
Defense for military boots) and that investment is lost due
to the condemnation, the interest holders should receive
compensation for the expected net return on that investment.
Third, the reproductioninterest should be protected. Thus, if
as a consequence of the eminent domain proceedings one suffered a loss to a thing not reproducable, compensation should
be given. This interest would protect one from the loss of
good will and the loss occasioned by the inability to relocate.
By designing valuation formulas around these three interests, it is asserted that benefits from a taking will be
equilibriated with costs, thereby preventing the dissociation
that leads to distorted resolution of land use conflicts. However, this alteration of the present market value formulas is
so substantial that it is believed that alteration is not the
function of the courts. Therefore, legislatures should consider the task, realizing when they do that they have not
embarked on a mission of equity adjustment, but rather that
they are finally discarding a doctrine which is at odds with
intelligent land use planning.
ROBERT P.
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